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Gender di erences in lying in sender-receiver games: A meta-analysis
Valerio Capraro 
Abstract
Whether there are gender di erences in lying has been largely debated in the past decade. Previous studies found mixed
results. To shed light on this topic, here I report a meta-analysis of 8,728 distinct observations, collected in 65 Sender-Receiver
game treatments, by 14 research groups. Following previous work and theoretical considerations, I distinguish three types of
lies: black lies, which benefit the liar at a cost for another person; altruistic white lies, which benefit another person at a cost
for the liar; and Pareto white lies, which benefit both the liar and another person. The results show that: males are significantly
more likely than females to tell black lies (N=4,173); males are significantly more likely than females to tell altruistic white
(N=2,940); and results are inconclusive in the case of Pareto white lies (N=1,615). Furthermore, gender di erences in telling
altruistic white lies are significantly stronger than in the other two cases.
Keywords: lying, honesty, deception, gender di erences, sex di erences.
1 Introduction
Many economic and social interactions are characterized by
asymmetric information. In these situations, people may be
tempted to misreport their private information. Although
standard economic theory predicts that people would lie as
long as that is beneficial to themselves, empirical research
in economics and psychology has shown that people do not
always lie. Cases in which people act honestly abound,
even when being dishonest would be beneficial to all parties
involved (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Cappelen, Sørensen & Tun-
godded, 2013; Biziou-van-Pol, Haenen, Novaro, Occhipinti-
Liberman & Capraro, 2015).
Why do some people act honestly while others do not?
Previous studies have approached this question from sev-
eral angles. For example, scholars have explored the role
of social and moral preferences (Biziou-van-Pol et al, 2015;
Levine & Schweitzer, 2014; Levine & Schweitzer, 2015;
Shalvi & de Dreu, 2014; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015), the
role of incentives (Dreber & Johannesson, 2008; Erat &
Gneezy, 2012; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Gneezy,
2005; Gneezy, Kajackaite & Sobel, 2018; Mazar, Amir &
Ariely, 2008; Sutter, 2009), the role of group-serving lies
versus individual-serving lies (Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun &
Murnighan, 2009; Conrads, Irlenbusch, Rilke & Walkowitz,
2013; Gino, Ayal&Ariely, 2013;Wiltermuth, 2011), and the
role of manipulating cognitive resources (Gino, Schweitzer,
Mead & Ariely, 2011; Shalvi, Eldar & Bereby-Meyer, 2012;
Gunia et al., 2012; van’t Veer, Stel & van Beest, 2014;
Capraro, 2017; Barcelo & Capraro, 2017; Lohse, Simon &
Konrad, 2018).
Copyright: © 2018. The authors license this article under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
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Another line of research that has received a great deal
of attention is whether there are gender di erences in lying.
An early paper by Dreber and Johannesson (2008) found that
males lie more than females, at least in the domain of black
lies, that is, lies that benefit the liar at a cost for another per-
son. This result was successfully replicated in some studies
(Friesen & Gangadharan, 2012; Capraro, Schulz & Rand,
2018) but not in others (Childs, 2012; Capraro & Peltola,
2018), which found no gender di erences in the context of
black lies. Subsequently, Erat and Gneezy (2012) observed
that the sign of gender di erences in lying might depend
on the consequences of the lie: they found that males lie
more than females in the context of Pareto white lies (lies
that benefit both the liar and another person), but females
lie more than males in the context of altruistic white lies
(lies that benefit another person at a cost for the liar). How-
ever, the former result was not replicated by Cappelen et al.
(2013), who found no gender di erences in the context of
Pareto white lies; and the latter result was not replicated by
Biziou-van-Pol et al (2015), who, in fact, found the opposite,
that males tell more altruistic white lies than females. These
mixed results suggest that gender di erences in lying, if they
exist, might be small and dependent on the consequences of
lying. Thus a meta-analytic approach can be useful to shed
light on the topic.
The contribution of this work is to make a step in this
direction by analyzing a large sample of more than 8,500
observations, coming from 65 di erent treatment conditions,
conducted by 14 di erent research groups, by taking also into
account the consequences of lying.
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1.1 Measure of honesty
Researchers have developed several measures of honest be-
havior. For example, in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
(2013), participants roll a die, in private, and then report
the resulting outcome knowing that they will be paid an
amount equal to the number they report, unless the number
is six, in which case they do not get any payment. Thus par-
ticipants have an incentive to lie (unless they get a five) for
their benefit. See also Greene & Paxton (2009), Fosgaard,
Hansen & Piovesan (2013), Ploner & Regner, (2013), Shalvi
& Leiser (2013), Pascual-Ezama, Prelec & Dunfield (2013),
van’t Veer, Stel & van Beest (2014). Conceptually similar is
the matrix search task (Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008) and the
visual perception task (Gino, Norton & Ariely, 2010). The
common denominator of these paradigms is that participants
complete a task and then they are paid according to the self-
reported performance in this task. Thus, also in this case,
participants are incentivized to lie for their own benefit.
Conceptually di erent is the so-called Sender-Receiver
game (also known as Deception game). There are various
formulations of this game (Gneezy, 2005; Erat & Gneezy,
2012), di ering in relatively minor details of the strategy
space or the type of information provided. But the general
structure is as follows. The experimenter gives a piece of
information (for example, the outcome of a die) to Player
1, but not to Player 2. Then Player 1 is asked to report
this information to Player 2. The role of Player 2 is to
guess the original piece of information (for example, the true
outcome of the die). If Player 2 guesses the original piece of
information, then Player 1 and Player 2 get paid according
to Option A; if Player 2 does not guess the original piece of
information, then Player 1 and Player 2 get paid according
to Option B. Only Player 1 knows the exact allocations of
money corresponding to OptionA andOption B. One variant
of the deception game was introduced by Biziou-van-Pol et
al. (2015), in order to avoid the problem of sophisticated
deception (i.e., Player 1 telling the truth because he or she
expects that Player 2 will not believe him or her, Sutter
2009). In this variant, Player 2 has no active choice: whether
participants are paid according to Option A or Option B
depends only on whether Player 1 decides to lie or to tell the
truth.
The Sender-Receiver game is particularly interesting be-
cause it allows to distinguish four types of lies, depending on
the payo s associated to Option A and Option B. Employing
the terminology introduced by Erat and Gneezy (2012), I use
the following taxonomy: black lies are those that benefit the
liar at the expenses of the other person; altruistic white lies
are those that benefit another person at a cost for the liar;
Pareto white lies are those that benefit both the liar and the
other person; Spiteful lies are those that harm both the liar
and the other person. The goal of this work is to study gen-
der di erences on lying as a function of the consequences of
lying.
1.2 Theoretical considerations
As mentioned above, previous empirical work suggests that
the sign of gender di erences in lying may depend on the
consequences of the lie. The existence of such a dependence
is in fact expected and can be actually derived from consid-
erations regarding gender di erences in social preferences
and moral judgments.
Previous work shows that males are more selfish than fe-
males in the dictator game, at least among students and Me-
chanical Turkers (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Branas-Garza,
Capraro & Rascón-Ramírez, 2018; Rand et al, 2016), al-
though perhaps not in the general population (Carpenter,
Connolly & Myers, 2008; Cappelen, Nygaard, Sørensen &
Tungodden, 2015). Several studies have also provided ev-
idence that males donate less than females to charity (De
Wit & Bekkers, 2016; Mesch et al, 2006; Piper & Schnepf,
2008). In line with this view, social role theorists argue
that males are more agentic and independent, while females
are more unselfish and communal (Eagly, 1987). These ob-
servations suggest that self-regarding motivations may push
males to tell more black lies than females, even when their
intrinsic costs of lying are, on average, the same.
Regarding gender di erences in altruistic behavior, An-
dreoni and Vesterlund (2001) found that females are more
altruistic thanmales when the altruistic action coincides with
the egalitarian action, but males are more altruistic than fe-
males when the altruistic action is socially e cient. This
suggests that gender di erences in the decision to tell al-
truistic white lies may depend on the actual consequences
of lying, such that females may tell more altruistic lies than
males when lying minimizes payo  di erences, while males
may tell more altruistic white lies than females when lying
is socially e cient.
Regarding Pareto white lies, two di erent arguments lead
to the prediction that it is likely that there are nomajor gender
di erences in lying. On the one hand, Pareto white lies – at
least those studied in previous literature and reported in this
paper – are both socially e cient and egalitarian. Thus, the
Andreoni and Vesterlund’s (2001) result mentioned above
suggests that females and males might be equally motivated
to tell Pareto white lies. An alternative argument descends
from considerations about the morality of lying. Accord-
ing to deontological ethics, an action is morally good if it
instantiates certain rules or ethical norms, regardless of the
consequences, and is morally bad if it violates them. Telling
the truth when lying is beneficial to all parties involved is
thus a typically deontological choice, as it corresponds to
following the rule “don’t lie”, regardless of consequences.
Therefore, the question whether there are gender di erences
in telling Pareto white lies can be seen as a particular spec-
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ification of the more general question of whether there are
gender di erences in deontological moral judgments. Pre-
vious research suggests that females are more deontological
than males, but only in moral dilemmas that involve directly
harming others for the greater good (Capraro&Sippel, 2017;
Fumagalli et al, 2010; Friesdorf et al, 2015). Since lying in
a Pareto white lie condition does not involve direct harm to
others, also this argument suggests that it is likely that there
are no major gender di erences in telling Pareto white lies.
2 Data collection
Data collection proceeded in several steps. First, on April 1,
2016, I announced my plan of conducting a meta-analysis of
two-player sender-receiver games on the ESA Experimental
Methods Discussion Google Group. In this way, scholars
interested in having their work included in the meta-analysis
could send me the raw data of their experiment(s). In the
days after, I have also conducted a 2x4 google scholar search
looking for pairs of keywords of the shape [gender, sex] x
[honesty, dishonesty, lying, deception], and I emailed the
authors of all relevant papers and requested the raw data
of their experiment(s). In doing so, I received raw data of
18 di erent experimental treatments (some published, some
not), to which I have added 32 di erent experimental condi-
tions of my research group (some published, some not). To
minimize file-drawer e ects, I included in the meta-analysis
also unpublished studies. Then I wrote a first draft of the
meta-analysis (6,508 observations), which I posted on SSRN
on March 11, 2017. I left this first draft online for almost
one year. Then, on January 25, 2018, I emailed the ESA
Experimental Methods Discussion Google Group again, an-
nouncing my plan to revise the meta-analysis. In this occa-
sion, scholars whose work had not been included in the first
version of the meta-analysis could send me the raw data of
their experiment(s). I sent the same email also to the Society
for Judgment and Decision Making emailing list, and I made
again the same 2x4 google search that I had made before.
In this second version of the meta-analysis1, I thus analyze
a total of 65 experimental treatments (36 from my own re-
search group and 29 from 13 di erent research groups), for
a total of 8,728 distinct observations (4,173 in black lies
conditions, 2,940 in altruistic white lies conditions, 1,615 in
Pareto white lies condition, and 0 in spiteful lies conditions).
Distinct means that, in case a subject participated in more
than one study (some studies were conducted on Amazon
Mechanical Turk, so I could keep track of subjects using
their MTurk ID and their IP address), I keep only the first
observation. Similarly, in case the data come from iterated
games, I keep only the first observation.
1After receiving the comments from the referees and while preparing the
revision, I have emailed the ESA Experimental Methods Discussion Group
and the Society for Judgment and Decision Making emailing list again to
collect more data. However, I did not receive any more data this time.
3 Overall analysis
I start analyzing all 65 studies together. To do so, for each
single study, I use logit regression to compute the e ect
of gender on honesty (which is a binary variable) with and
without control on age and level of education (when known).2
Logit regression applied to single studies has the limitation
that, if the dependent variable can be perfectly predicted, it
returns no coe cient. For example, if, for a given study,
all females act honestly, then logit regression returns no
coe cient. This happens rarely in these dataset (3 studies
over 65). When this happens, I do a correction by adding
one data point by hand in such a way to maintain the sign of
the e ect.
Then I build a .csv file with twenty columns: study, gen-
derc, genderse, genderc_control, genderse_control, altru-
istic_lie, black_lie, pareto_lie, capraro, levine, greenberg,
kouchaki, rode, cohen, gneezy, hershfield, roeser, dreber,
gunia, shemereta, where, for each study, genderc (resp. gen-
derse) is the coe cient (resp. the standard error) of the logit
regression predicting honesty as a function of gender with-
out control on age and level of education; similarly, gen-
derc_control (resp. genderse_control) is the coe cient (resp.
the standard error) of the logit regression predicting honesty
as a function of gender with control on age and level of
education; altruistic_lie, black_lie, and pareto_lie are three
dummy variables that represent the consequences of lying
in the corresponding sender-receiver game3; and capraro,
levine, greenberg, kouchaki, rode, cohen, gneezy, hershfield,
roeser, dreber, gunia, shemereta are dummy variables repre-
senting the research group of the corresponding study, which
I include as a potential moderator.
To look at the e ect of gender on lying, I conduct random-
e ect meta-analysis with the Stata command: metan gen-
derc genderse, random label(namevar=study). The results,
shown in Figure 1, clearly show a significant overall e ect
such that females are more honest than males (e ect size =
0.271, 95% CI = [0.172,0.370], Z = 5.37, p < 0.001). This
e ect is robust after controlling for age and level of education
(e ect size = 0.283, 95% CI = [0.182,0.384], Z = 5.49, p <
0.001). Furthermore, there is no evidence of heterogeneity
across studies in the true size of this e ect (without control:
p = 0.553; with control: p = 0.631).
To test for potential publication bias and small study e ect,
without and with control on age and education, I conduct Eg-
ger’s test and Begg’s test with the Stata commands metabias
2I include controls for age and education because they seem to have
an e ect on lying (logit regression over the pool of studies; age: coe  =
0.005, z = 2.40, p = 0.016; education: coe  =  0.081, z =  3.90, p<.001).
Moreover, age has a significant e ect on gender (coe  = 0.116, z = 5.94, p
< .001), while education has no correlation with gender (coe  =  0.019, z
=  0.92, p = 0.357).
3I do not include a dummy variable to represent the actual consequences
of lying in the case of altruistic white lies (socially e cient vs. egalitarian)
because in all studies analyzed in this work lying in the altruistic white lie
conditions is always socially e cient.
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NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
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F      1: Meta-analysis of gender di erences on lying across all 65 studies (with no control on age and level of education).
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genderc genderse, egger, metabias genderc_control gen-
derse_control, egger metabias genderc genderse, begg and
metabias genderc_control genderse_control, begg. In doing
so, I find no evidence of publication bias and small study
e ect (Egger’s test: without control: t =  0.99, p = 0.328;
with control: t =  0.67, p = 0.507; Begg’s test: without
control: z =  0.62, p = 0.533; with control: z =  0.44, p =
0.659).
Next, I explore whether the gender e ect depends on
lie type. To do so, I conduct meta-regression with the
Stata command metareg genderc altruistic_lie black_lie,
wsse(genderse) and then I test whether the gender e ect
depends on the categorical variable of lie type by launching
the command test altruistic_lie black_lie. In doing so, I find
a significant e ect (p = 0.049) of lie type, suggesting that,
indeed, gender di erences in lying depends on the conse-
quences of the lie. The mean e ect sizes for the three lie
types are .19 for black lies, .47 for altruistic white lies, and
.22 for Pareto white lies.
A potential problem with this analysis is that some stud-
ies come from the same research group. Controlling for
research group by launching the command metareg genderc
altruistic_lie black_lie capraro levine greenberg kouchaki
rode cohen, wsse(genderse), I find that the e ect of lie type
is robust (p = 0.035).
To better understand the moderation e ect of lie type,
I analyzed the gender e ect as a function of two dummy
variables, one for altruistic white lies and one for black lies,
using Pareto white lies as the baseline, and again controlling
for research group.4 Although the di erence between Pareto
lies and black lies was clearly not significant, consistent with
the similarity of the two e ect sizes, the di erence between
Pareto lies and altruistic white lies was significant (without
control: p = .045; with control: p = .032), a result that is
also consistent with the e ect size di erence, although weak
because of the small number of studies of Pareto lies. A
similar analysis showed a highly significant di erence in the
gender e ect between black lies and altruistic white lies. In
sum, once again, the gender e ect appears to be greater in
altruistic white lies than in the other two types.
In the next sections, I analyze the gender e ect on lying
for each of these conditions more closely.
4 Black lies
I start by analyzing gender di erences on the decision to tell
black lies, i.e., lies that benefit the liar at the expenses of
another person.
4This analysis was done with the metafor package of R, which otherwise
produced results identical to those reported in this article, except for an
occasional di erence in the last decimal place. Research group itself had an
almost-significant e ect (p = .093) when lie type was included, so it seemed
necessary to keep it in the model.
4.1 Dataset
I analyze N = 4,173 distinct observations, coming from 36
di erent experimental conditions: fourteen conducted bymy
research group, six by Emma Levine (unpublished), one by
Sheremeta & Shields (2013), three by Greenberg, Smeets,
and Zhurakhovska (2015), one by Dreber and Johannes-
son (2008), one by Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun and Murnighan
(2009), one by Cohen, Wolf, Panter and Insko (2011), one
by Gneezy et al (2013), one by Gunia et al (2012), one by
Hershfield, Cohen and Thomson (2012), two by Kouchaki
and Smith (2014), two byKouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief and
Sousa (2013), two by Rode (2010), and one by Roeser et al
(2016).
4.2 Analysis
On average, 36% of males versus 44% of females are hon-
est. Random-e ects meta-analysis shows that females are
significantly more honest than males (e ect size = 0.186,
95% CI = [0.053,0.319], Z = 2.73, p = 0.006). This e ect is
robust after controlling for age and, when possible, for level
of education (e ect size = 0.184, 95% CI = [0.049,0.320],
Z = 2.67, p = 0.008). Furthermore, there is no evidence
of heterogeneity across studies in the true size of this e ect
(without control: p = 0.787; with control: p = 0.836). Fig-
ure 2 is a forest plot of the meta-analysis. Finally, Egger’s
test (without control: z =  0.56, p = 0.580; with control:
z = 0.15, p = 0.878) and Begg’s test (without control: z =
 0.58, p = 0.565; with control: z = -0.05, p = 0.958) show
no evidence of publication bias and small study e ect.
Note that the overall e ect is relatively small, and this
might explain why previous research failed to consistently
detect gender di erences. A power analysis indeed shows
that, to detect the overall e ect with power 0.9 at a 5%
significant level, one needs a sample of size N=3,091.
5 Altruistic white lies
Next I analyze gender di erences on the decision to tell
altruistic white lies, lies that benefit another person at a cost
for the liar.
5.1 Dataset
I analyze N = 2,940 distinct observations, in 20 experimental
conditions: fourteen by my research group, and six (unpub-
lished) by Emma Levine’s. In all these conditions, lying is
socially e cient, whereas telling the truth minimizes payo 
di erences.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol.   , No.  , July      Meta-analysis of gender di erences in lying 350
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
Overall  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.787)
Overall  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.787)
dreber_johannesson
dreber_johannesson
kouchaki_et_ l_2
kouchaki_et_al_2
capr o_24
capraro_24
1
capraro_21
3
capraro_23
ID
ID
16
capraro_16
2
capraro_22
hen_gunia_et_al
cohen_gunia_et_al
g berg_sm ts_zhurakhovska_3
greenberg_smeets_zhurakhovska_3
7
capraro_17
8
capraro_28
le in 10
levine_10
levine_12
n zy t_al
gneezy_et_al
5
capraro_25
9
levine_9
r d _2
rode_2
unia_ t al
gunia_et_al
9
capraro_19
1
greenberg_smeets_zhurakhovska_1
rode
smith 1
kouchaki_smith_1
St dy
Study
8
levine_8
capraro_27
levine_11
kouchaki_et_al
7
levine_7
hershfi ld_coh n_tho son
hershfield_cohen_thomson
kouchaki_smith_2
capraro_18
capraro_15
sh mer ta
shemereta
capraro_26
wolf_et al
cohen_wolf_et_al
2
greenberg_smeets_zhurakhovska_2
0
capraro_20
et l
roeser_et_al
0.19 (0. 5, 0.32)
0.19 (0.05, 0.32)
70 6 1 4
0.70 (0.06, 1.34)
-0.03 (-1. 2, 1. 6)
-0.03 (-1.32, 1.26)
0 5 0 58
-0.03 (-0.65, 0.58)
9 5
-0.09 (-0.72, 0.55)
2
-0.23 (-0.75, 0.28)
ES ( 5% CI)
ES (95% CI)
54 -0.3 , 1.47)
0.54 (-0.39, 1.47)
6 2 6
0.69 (0.02, 1.36)
8 58
0.68 (-0.21, 1.58)
2 6
0.72 (-0.18, 1.61)
97 2 26
0.97 (-0.32, 2.26)
0 4 0
0.08 (-0.41, 0.57)
1 2 6 3 3
0.51 (-2.61, 3.63)
6 9
0.56 (-2.47, 3.59)
2 0 4 7 7
-2.20 (-4.97, 0.57)
3 85
0.30 (-0.24, 0.85)
0 0
0.51 (-2.00, 3.02)
18 1
-0.18 (-1.01, 0.66)
0.57 (-0.15, 1.29)
3 9
0.33 (-0.31, 0.98)
9
0.08 (-0.92, 1.07)
14
-0.13 (-1.41, 1.14)
2 4 89
-0.22 (-1.34, 0.89)
5 8
0.35 (-0.89, 1.59)
2 7
0.28 (-0.16, 0.73)
0.92 (-1.64, 3.47)
4
0.44 (-1.07, 1.95)
6
-0.16 (-1.61, 1.29)
3
-0.13 (-1.65, 1.39)
3
0.19 (-1.00, 1.39)
0.21 (-0.95, 1.37)
6 90
-0.03 (-0.96, 0.90)
0.40 (-0.65, 1.45)
0.25 (-0.20, 0.69)
54 9 71
-0.54 (-1.79, 0.71)
1 2 0 - . 5)
-1.22 (-2.30, -0.15)
0.22 (-0.39, 0.83)
3
-0.08 (-0.83, 0.67)
10 .0
100.00
4
4.31
1.07
4.75
4.43
6
6.72
W ig t
Weight
2
2.04
4.00
2.23
2.23
1.07
7
7.46
0.18
0.19
0.23
5 8
5.88
0.28
2.54
3
3.40
4.21
1.79
1.09
1.43
%
%
1.16
8
8.92
0.27
0.78
0.85
0.77
1.24
1.32
2.06
1.60
8.90
1.13
1.53
4.80
3.14
 
  0
4 97
-4.97 4.97
F      2: Forest plot of the meta-analysis of the gender di erences in telling black lies (with no control on age and level of
education).
5.2 Analysis
On average, 76% of males versus 83% of females acts hon-
estly. Random-e ects meta-analysis finds that females are
more honest than males (e ect size = 0.469, 95% CI =
[0.256,0.681], Z = 4.33, p < 0.001). This e ect is also robust
after controlling for sex and, when possible, for the level
of education (e ect size = 0.537, 95% CI = [0.341,0.733],
Z = 5.37, p < 0.001). Furthermore, there is no evidence
of heterogeneity across studies in the true size of this e ect
(without control: p = 0.315; with control: p = 0.493). Figure
2 shows a forest plot. Finally, there is no evidence of publi-
cation bias and small studies e ect (without control: Egger’s
test: t =  0.70, p = 0.494; Begg’s test: z =  0.59, p = 0.552.
With control: Egger’s test: t =  0.94, p = 0.359; Begg’s test:
z =  1.36, p = 0.172).
Note again that the overall e ect is relatively small, and
this might explain why previous research failed to consis-
tently detect gender di erences. A power analysis indeed
shows that to detect the overall e ect with power 0.9 at a 5%
significant level one needs a sample of size N=728.
6 Pareto white lies
Finally, I explore gender di erences on the decision to tell
Pareto white lies, that is, lies that benefit both the liar and
another person.
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F      3: Forest plot of the meta-analysis of the gender di erences in telling Altruistic white lies (with no control on age and
level of education).
6.1 Dataset
I analyze N = 1,615 distinct observations, in 8 experimental
conditions, all by my research group.
6.2 Analysis
On average, 26% of males versus 29% of females acts hon-
estly. Random-e ect meta-analysis finds that males are al-
most significantly more dishonest than females, when I do
not control for age and level of education (e ect size = 0.222,
95% CI = [ 0.012, 0.457], Z = 1.86, p = 0.063). However,
this almost significant e ect is a little weaker after control-
ling for age and level of education (e ect size = 0.214, 95%
CI = [ 0.026,0.455], Z = 1.75, p = 0.080). There is no het-
erogeneity across studies (without control: p = 0.654; with
control: 0.705) and no evidence of publication bias, neither
without control (Egger’s test: t =  0.04, p = 0.966; Begg’s
test: z = 0.25, p = 0.805), nor with control on age and ed-
ucation (Egger’s test: t = 0.13, p = 0.898; Begg’s test: z =
0.25, p = 0.805).
7 Discussion
In this work, I have analyzed gender di erences in lying
using a dataset of 8,728 distinct observations, collected us-
ing the sender-receiver game, in 65 experimental treatments,
from 14 research groups. Following previous work and mo-
tivated by theoretical considerations, I have distinguished
three types of lies: black lies, altruistic white lies, and Pareto
white lies. The results show that: (i) males are significantly
more likely than females to tell black lies; (ii) males are sig-
nificantlymore likely than females to tell altruistic white lies;
(iii) results are inconclusive in the case of Pareto white lies.
Furthermore, gender di erences in telling altruistic white
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F      4: Forest plot of the meta-analysis of the gender di erences in telling Pareto white lies (with no control on age and
level of education).
lies are stronger than gender di erences in telling black lies
and stronger than gender di erences in telling Pareto white
lies. (The di erence between black lies and Pareto white lies
is not quite significant, but the gender e ect size for Pareto
lies is essentially the same as that for black lies, although the
sample size of the former is smaller.)
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first meta-analysis
on gender di erences in lying, which also takes into account
the consequences of lying. The closest work I am aware
of is indeed a meta-analysis of empirical studies measuring
(dis)honesty using the die-under-cup task (Abeler, Nosenzo
& Raymond, in press). In the die-under-cup paradigm, sub-
jects roll a die, privately, and then are paid according to the
outcome they report. In this way subjects are incentivized to
misreport the outcome (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013).
Thus, among the black lie, the altruistic white lie, and the
Pareto white lie conditions, the one that is nearer to the die-
under-cup task is the black lie condition: in both the black lie
condition and the die-under-cup task the liar benefits from
the lie and the lie harms someone else (although the neg-
ative e ect of the lie on someone else is somewhat more
salient in the sender-receiver game, where another player is
directly harmed, than in the die-under-cup task, where the
experimenter is indirectly harmed). In line with the current
meta-study, also Abeler et al. (in press) finds that males are
more likely than females to lie.
The main innovation of the current work is to consider
also the consequences of lying. Taking them into account is
crucial, especially in light of previous work on lying aver-
sion, social preferences, and deontological moral judgments,
which suggest that gender di erences in lyingmay depend on
the consequences of the lie. For example, Erat and Gneezy
(2012) found that females are more dishonest than males in
the case of altruistic white lies, while males may be more
dishonest than females in the case of Pareto white lies.
In contrast to Erat and Gneezy (2012), the current meta-
analysis shows that males are more dishonest than females
also in the case of altruistic white lies. However, it is im-
portant to note that the current analysis does not include the
data from Erat and Gneezy (2012)5, showing the opposite
e ect. One may thus wonder whether including Erat and
Gneezy (2012) might change the results. To address this
5I asked the data by email to Uri Gneezy, who replied that “the relevant
data from my papers (gender and decisions) is in the papers or online
appendix”. Not having found the exact data on the appendix, I used the
results reported in the paper to estimate the e ect as reported in the main
text.
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point, I have conducted a robustness check by estimating the
logit regression coe cients in Erat and Gneezy (2012) from
the results reported in their paper6. Re-running the meta-
analysis by adding this estimated coe cient does not change
the qualitative result: males still appear to lie significantly
more than females (without control: e ect size = 0.395, 95%
CI [0.158,0.632], Z = 3.27, p = 0.001; with control: e ect
size = 0.450 95% CI [0.221,0.680], Z = 3.84, p < 0.001).
This suggests that the original finding by Erat and Gneezy
(2012) might have been a false positive.
The current results are inconclusive in the case of Pareto
white lies. Males seem to be slightly more dishonest than
females, but the results fall short of statistical significance.
Still, there might be a small e ect that I was unable to detect
due to the limited power.7 One might thus wonder whether
the e ect would become significant with a larger sample.
As far as I know, there is only one paper using Pareto white
lies that it is not included in this meta-analysis, and this
is this work by Cappelen et al. (2013).8 Does including
this study resolve this inconclusiveness? Unfortunately, this
does not happen, fundamentally because the results are actu-
ally trending in the opposite direction, with females slightly
more likely to lie than males. More formally, by estimat-
ing the coe cient from Cappelen et al. (2013)9 and rerun-
ning the meta-analysis, I still find that males are not signif-
icantly more dishonest than females (without control: 95%
CI [ 0.079,0.328], Z = 1.20, p = 0.231; with control: 95%
CI [ 0.092,0.322], Z = 1.09, p = 0.278). Note that the
p-values are further away from significance, essentially be-
cause, as already mentioned, Cappelen et al.’s (2013) results
are trending in the opposite direction from the original e ect.
As described in the Theoretical Considerations section,
the overall pattern of results is consistent with the hypothe-
sis that females and males do not di er in the intrinsic cost
of lying, but they di er only on social preferences: males are
more selfish than females and more concerned about social
e ciency than females; while females are more concerned
than males about reaching an equitable distribution of pay-
o s. This explanation is consistent with the main e ects
of gender for each type of lie because all altruistic white
lies conditions analyzed in this work are characterized by
6Erat and Gneezy (2012) conducted an altruistic white lie condition
with N=101 subjects (62 males and 39 females). Also in their experiment,
lying is socially e cient while being honest is egalitarian. They found a
proportion of lying of 41% among females and 27% among males. To
estimate the logit regression coe cient, I assume that 16 females lie versus
17 males.
7Power analysis shows that to detect the overall e ect with power 0.9 at
a 5% level one needs a sample of size N=2,103.
8I emailed all three authors of the Cappelen et al. (2013) paper to ask for
their data, but I received no answer. For this reason, I opted for estimating
their e ect from the result reported in their paper and included this in the
present additional analysis.
9To estimate the regression coe cients, I use the results reported in
Cappelen et al. (2013) as follows. Lying was 65.6% among females and
61.9% among males. I assume they have 200 males and 200 females,
although in reality they have 352 subjects in total.
the fact that lying increases the social welfare while being
honest minimizes inequities. This explanation seems also
consistent with the moderation e ect of lie type: in all stud-
ies for which the payo  consequences of lying depend only
on the sender’s decision (that are only my studies), Pareto
lies are more equitable than altruistic lies, and altruistic lies
are on average more socially e cient than black lies. (The
average increase in e ciency when telling altruistic lie is 9
cents, while the average increase in e ciency in telling black
lies is only 4.91 cents).
Of course, more work should be devoted to test this hy-
pothesis. For example, it would be important to explore
gender di erences in telling altruistic white lies in situations
in which lying minimizes payo  di erences, while being
honest is socially e cient and maximize the individual pay-
o . The aforementioned view predicts that the sign of the
gender di erence in this case should switch.
Future research should also explore gender di erences
in telling spiteful lies, that is, lies that harm both players.
Unfortunately, this kind of lie has been studied very little in
the literature. The only study I am aware of is by Rosaz and
Villeval (2012), who found only 3.9% of lying. They did not
report gender di erences. Exploring gender di erences in
the decision to tell spiteful lies is an interesting avenue for
future research.
Another interesting route for further work regards finding
potential moderators. The current analysis found no hetero-
geneity e ect in the meta-analysis. Of course, this does not
imply that the gender e ect is not moderated by any variable.
It could simply be that I was not able to detect heterogeneity
because of insu cient power. Exploring whether the gender
e ect is moderated by other variables could be an interesting
topic for further research.
In sum, here I studied gender di erences in lying using
a large dataset of 8,728 observations on the sender-receiver
game. I found two clear results: males are more likely than
females to tell black lies, and males are more likely than
females to tell altruistic white lies (at least when lying is
socially e cient). Future research should explore gender
di erences in the case of Pareto white lies and spiteful lies,
and in the case of altruistic white lies, when lying minimizes
payo  di erences, while being honest is socially e cient
and individually optimal.
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